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a significantly positive impact on outflows or not. Second, we ask the question which member 
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1. Introduction 
The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009 and has brought about at least one 
significant change in the area of EU’s common commercial policy. The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union now places foreign direct investment as an area of exclusive 
EU competence. This means that the EU is now the sole negotiator of international investment 
treaties and that member states can no longer negotiate international agreements on foreign 
direct investment with third countries.
1 Although the issue of how the transfer of competences 
in this area from member states to the EU should be handled is better left to EC lawyers, there 
are several important questions that economists should address to contribute to future 
investment policy in the EU. 
The aim of this paper is to address several questions that are relevant to the EU’s future 
investment policy. The EU Commission is in the process of drafting a proposal on how to 
grandfather all 1,557 existing bilateral investment treaties of the 27 member states to integrate 
member state Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) into EU law. Hence, the first question we 
address in this paper is to empirically test whether the existing member state BITs have the 
desired positive impact on foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows to the host developing 
countries. By default BITs are intended to promote and protect investment in the contracting 
country by the counterparty investor. Typically, the BITs define the type of investment and 
investor that is covered. In addition to this, BITs are intended to protect the investor against 
arbitrary expropriation by the host country government without compensation and offer an 
investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism. As such, BITs are intended to reduce risk to 
investment.  
The empirical literature on the impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI flows is 
ambiguous. While several studies indicate that the relationship between BITs and FDI is 
positive and statistically significant (e.g. Busse et al, 2008; Egger and Pfafferamayr, 2004; 
Neumayer and Spess, 2005; Salacuse and Sullivan 2004), several others either find a negative or 
no statistically significant relationship (e.g. Hallward-Driemeier, 2003 and Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman, 2004). Recent literature has recognised that several of these studies fail to find a 
significant relationship between BITs and FDI as they do not account for endogeneity. Indeed, it 
is difficult to assess the impact of BITs on FDI while the selection of the BIT partner is 
endogeneously determined. In addition to the reverse causality, the potential endogeneity in 
BIT/FDI literature is further exacerbated by omitted variables bias.  
We use large panel data of bilateral FDI inflows to 25 middle-income developing countries from 
14 OECD member countries over the period 1992-2004 to examine the impact of member state 
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BITs on FDI. This period captures both the surge in global FDI flows and the number of BITs 
signed and implemented. As International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
statistics indicate, the number of BITs in the world increased from 636 in 1992 to 2,216 in 2004. 
Analogous to literature on the impact of free trade agreements on trade, we use BIT treatment 
effect à la Baier and Bergstrand (2007). In order to address concerns over potential endogeneity 
in our model, we use a modified gravity-type model and estimate the relationship between BITs 
and FDI by a fixed-effects model controlling for both country-pair fixed effects and time 
effects. Models estimated with country-pair fixed-effects are shown to effectively eliminate the 
selection bias (e.g. Razin et al., 2003; Helpman et al., 2005). We find a positive and statistically 
significant impact of the existing BITs on member states’ FDI in the sample developing 
countries. We test the robustness of our results against the omitted variable bias, strict 
exogeneity and also sensitivity against different estimation techniques. The positive impact of 
BITs on EU FDI in the developing countries is robust when the level of economic and political 
reform in the host country is controlled for by introducing the level of privatisation proceeds in 
the host country, an index of risk of expropriation, the level of democratic development and the 
level of trade linkages. The economic impact of BITs on member states’ FDI outflows is 
stronger in estimations using both random effects and pooled OLS models. Following Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007), we control for strict exogeneity and find no feedback effect from FDI 
outflows to BITs.  
We also address two other policy relevant questions. In its Roadmap (2010), the EC 
Commission raises the question of what a EU BIT should look like. To address this issue, we 
first ask whether some member states’ BITs could be identified as having a significantly more 
positive effect on FDI than others. The impact of the BIT can work through two channels: by 
effectively reducing risk to investment and by increasing market access through FDI 
liberalisation.
2 Our results indicate that the entry into force of BITs of Austria and France had a 
statistically significant positive effect on their FDI outflows. There is also evidence that BITs of 
Austria exert a positive influence on FDI outflows through protection of investment and 
reducing risk, whereas in France BITs also have provided significant market access.  
Second, we address the question of with which countries the EU should negotiate its new 
investment treaties. As the Roadmap indicates, when the transition period of grandfathering of 
existing BITs comes to an end, the EU is going to choose a number of third countries to 
negotiate with. We argue that the priority should be given to those where the existing BITs have 
had a positive impact already. Among EU’s BIT partners only Philippines, Romania and South 
Africa have positively benefited from signing BITs with the EU.  
The next section discusses both patterns of FDI outflows of the EU and its selection of BIT 
partners. Section 3 introduces description of data and methodology and section 4 follows with 
results. Section 5 concludes.  
2.  Foreign Direct Investment and Bilateral Investment Treaties of the EU 
In this section we examine the outward FDI performance of the EU and present some qualitative 
analysis of its bilateral investment treaties. The EU27 is the number one source of FDI flows 
globally. The total FDI outflows of the EU27 peaked at €1.2 trillion in 2007 (more than four 
times FDI outflows invested by the US) with FDI outward stocks reaching €8.2 trillion in the 
same year. As FDI is also home-biased like trade, the majority of EU27 FDI outflows are 
destined to other member states. Intra-EU27 FDI outflows reached €707 billion, leaving €530 
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billion for extra-EU27 outflows in 2007.
3 In terms of most favoured extra-EU destinations, 
North America is by far the largest recipient of EU FDI outflows with a peak in 2007 at €199 
billion. In other regions of the world, the EU27 invested €25.2 billion in Latin America, €17.9 
billion in Africa, €53.9 billion in Asia.  
The first question one would ask is whether countries that have signed bilateral investment 
treaties with the EU are receiving significantly larger amounts of FDI compared to non-BIT 
partners. As a start, we can see in Table 1 that the EU27 have signed 1,557 BITs to date 
compared to Japan and the US, which have signed 11 and 48 BITs only respectively (ICSID, 
2010). Among the member states, with 147 BITs signed, Germany is by far the most active 
proponent of BITs. Germany is also the member state with the oldest BIT in the world: 
Germany negotiated and signed its first BITs with Pakistan and the Dominican Republic in 
1959. Germany negotiated several BITs with many countries in Africa and Asia in the 1960s as 
well. Nevertheless, among the member states, the UK has accumulated the largest extra-EU FDI 
outward stocks, followed by France and then Germany (Table 1).
4 One can observe that the EU 
member states that have the highest number of BITs also have the largest stocks of FDI invested 
abroad. This may suggest that indeed the promotion and protection offered by BITs may be 
encouraging FDI outflows.  
There are several other factors that play a role in the selection of a host location for FDI. The 
empirical literature indicates that country size and income play a positive role whereas distance 
deters investment, much the same as for trade. Factors that facilitate the flow of information, 
such as sharing a common language, common law origin, having signed a regional trade 
agreement, and indeed trade flows all encourage FDI. Hence the selection of the BIT partner 
may not be exogenous. For example, among all the developing countries of the world, only a 
subset of them receive the majority of FDI. Indeed the so-called emerging market economies 
have been highly successful in attracting FDI. As can be seen in Table 2, there are diverse 
patterns in terms of the region that each member state prefers for its BIT partners. For example, 
Germany has signed BITs with 47 countries out of 53 in Africa, 26 out of 41 in Asia and 22 out 
of 32 in Latin America. On the other hand, France has signed BITs with most countries in Latin 
America (20 out of 32) and least with countries in Africa (21 out of Africa). Overall, the 
coverage ratio of BITs is higher for Asia than for Latin America and lowest for Africa. Detailed 
examination of data does not always suggest that the date of signature of a BIT has an 
immediate impact on FDI flows. For example, for several African countries, the flows have 
always been small both before and after the BIT. In contrast, for emerging market economies 
like Brazil, FDI flows have always been large. 
Table 3 below shows in the first column the number of member states that have signed a BIT 
with an emerging market economy. These countries are among the few in each region to receive 
the majority of FDI. Indeed with the exception of Brazil and Colombia, the majority of EU15 
member states and some of the new member states have signed BITs with all the emerging 
market economies.
5 Even though Brazil has not ratified any of its bilateral investment treaties, 
the EU has FDI outward stocks of €112 billion in Brazil. Contrary to what one might expect, 
FDI stocks in China are limited and less than FDI stocks in Turkey. Even though 24 member 
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states have signed BITs with China, with the exception of Austria-China and Belgium-
Luxembourg-China BIT, the majority were signed in the last decade.  
In Table 3, column 3 we present FDI investment income flows from each emerging market 
economy to the EU27. One important criterion for the choice of investment location is the return 
to investment given risk. Anecdotal evidence indicates that investors first choose a region and 
then a country in that region to invest. This may explain why a few countries in each region 
receive the majority FDI inflows from the world. If the decision to negotiate a BIT is 
endogenous, then we would expect to see large flows prior to signature of the BIT. High return 
may also encourage investment that in return may increase the probability of selection into a 
BIT. Among the emerging market economies, Chile presents the highest return to EU FDI, by 
14%, followed by Malaysia, Indonesia and Korea. All of these countries have signed BITs with 
the EU15 and some of the new member states. Turkey, which has signed 21 BITs with the 
EU27, so far has a low rate of return; 5% like Morocco. Return to FDI has also been modest in 
China, with 7% return to EU investment where there are 24 BITs signed.  
In this section, we present some patterns in FDI outflows and a selection of BIT partners of the 
EU. The EU is the world’s largest FDI investor and is the first ever BIT negotiator. Member 
states rely on BITs to a larger extent than the US and Japan. The qualitative analysis in this 
section shows that each member state has negotiated several BITs with a different set of 
countries in each region. However, there is a tendency to negotiate BITs more with Asian and 
Latin American countries than with African countries. Finally, EU member states have 
negotiated BITs with all emerging market economies that have been successful in attracting 
FDI. There is also a positive correlation between the total number of BITs signed and FDI 
outflows.  
3.  Data and methodology 
In this section we describe the data and methodology used in order to test the differential impact 
of EU’s BITs on FDI outflows. To this end we have constructed a large dataset of bilateral FDI 
flows using OECD’s International Investment Statistics database. The panel dataset includes 14 
OECD countries as reporters and 25 middle-income emerging market economies as partners 
over the period 1992-2004. This dataset covers over 90% of EU’s FDI outflows.  
We model the EU’s FDI outflows using a modified gravity model. Gravity models have been 
extensively used in modelling bilateral trade flows and, recently, FDI flows, and have been 
empirically highly successful with recent theoretical background as well. We argue that among 
several panel estimation techniques, using the fixed-effects model is theoretically the most 
suitable. As Baier and Bergstrand (2007) show, fixed-effects models on panel data including 
bilateral (country-pair) fixed-effects and country-and-time (it, jt) dummies are superior to other 
estimations methodologies such as pooled OLS, or random-effects models. One of the most 
important advantages of using a fixed-effects model on our panel data is that we will be able to 
control for unobserved endogeneity, which is raised as a concern in literature. After all, it is 
widely accepted that investment policy cannot be exogeneous to investment volumes. Solving 
the problem of endogeneity is extremely cumbersome using methods such as instrumental 
variable (IV) techniques simply because it is difficult to find good proxies of a investment 
policy, i.e. an BIT.  
Unlike other estimation techniques, for example with OLS on cross-section data that produce 
biased estimates, or random-effects models that assume no correlation between unobservables 
(aij) and the BIT variable, the fixed-effects estimator is an unbiased and consistent estimator of 
the treatment effect of a BIT. The downside of the fixed-effects estimator is that one cannot 
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variation in the data and hence wipes out any time-invariant variables in the model. In other 
words, all time-invariant variables that are part of the standard gravity models such as bilateral 
distance, common language, adjacency, etc. will be subsumed by the country-pair fixed-effect 
aij. One final concern regarding the choice of a fixed-effects estimator is that due to the 
particular shape of our dataset, where n (number of country-pairs= 350) are large and the time-
series dimension of our dataset is short t=12, the fixed-effect estimator suffers from the 
‘incidental parameter’ problem (Baltagi, 2001) and hence produces inconsistent estimates of 
dummy variables. In order to adjust for that, we will present results from within effect estimator. 
In order to estimate the treatment effect of EU’s BITs on EU’s FDI outflows with its investment 
partners, we estimate the following equation: 
Ln(FDI)ijt = αij + ln (GDP)it + ln (GDP)jt + ln (Income)it + + ln (Income)jt + BIT ijt 
+ Xjt + tij + eijt      (1) 
The dependent variable, ln(FDI)ijt is the natural log (ln) of 14 OECD member country FDI 
outflows in constant $US dollars to their 25 investment partners. In order to control for the 
impact of the size of the OECD country and the emerging market economies, we introduce real 
GDP of both the reporter (i) and the partner (j) at time t in natural log. We also introduce real 
GDP per capita of both the investor and host as proxies of income. We would expect a positive 
relationship between the GDP per capita and FDI volumes as the two countries converge in 
levels of income. In an analogy to the Linder hypothesis, we expect that the more similar the 
demand structure of two countries are, as proxied by GDP per capitas, the more intense the 
potential flows between them will be. All GDP and GDP per capita variables are from the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook April 2010 database. Finally, we use a BIT dummy variable 
that takes on the value 1 when the reporting OECD country signed a BIT with the partner 
country and zero otherwise. The data on the dates of BITs are from the database of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
6 
4. Results 
In this section we present results on the differential impact of bilateral investment treaties on 
FDI outflows. In Table 4, we test first the impact of OECD BITs in general in our sample. As 
the ICSID statistics indicate our sample period, 1992-2004, covers a period of greater activity 
where the number of BITs in the world increased from 636 in 1992 to 2,216 in 2004. In Table 4 
we regress FDI outflows from OECD countries to emerging market economies on standard 
gravity variables, GDP, income, distance a set of control variables such as bilateral trade flows, 
privation proceeds in $US, and a dummy for colony. We control for trade flows as countries that 
trade more also tend to invest more. In other words, trade can act as a channel for information, 
increasing familiarity and hence reducing transaction costs in a host country. We use 
privatisation proceeds in $US millions from the World Bank’s Privatization Database to control 
for the level of economic reform the emerging economies went through. We also use a dummy 
for colony to identify whether the host country has ever been colonised by the source country.  
Both for theoretical and econometric reasons, we focus on the results of the fixed-effects 
estimator in column 1 but we present random-effects and pooled OLS results in column 2 and 3 
as well. The results in column 1 indicates that BITs have a statistically significant and positive 
impact on the FDI outflows from 14 OECD source countries to their BIT partner. The 
coefficient of BIT indicates that when the BIT is implemented the source country FDI increases 
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by 1.32%.
7 Other variables that are statistically significant have the expected positive sign with 
the exception of GDP per capita of the host country. In columns 2 and 3 we can control for 
time-invariant variables such as distance and colony. Controlling for distance and colonial 
history, BITs have a robust positive impact on FDI in both random-effects and pooled OLS 
models.  
In Table 5 we test the robustness of EU’s BITs using the same specification as in Table 4. Both 
in fixed-effect and random effect models EU BITs have a statistically significant and positive 
impact on FDI, indicating an estimated 1.32% increase in FDI through time. In Table 6, we test 
the robustness of EU BITs by introducing several potential explanatory variables to reduce the 
probability of endogeneity due to omitted variable bias. In this table and the ones that follow we 
present results only from the fixed-effects estimator. We add the POLITY2 variable from the 
POLITY IV project of University of Maryland to measure the level of democracy in the host 
country. This index ranges from -10 to 10, increasing as the host countries’ political freedom 
improves. We expect that as a country becomes more democratic, it should receive more FDI as 
political reform and economic reform are shown to be positively correlated (see, for example, 
Persson, 2005).  
In this paper we will argue that the effect of the BIT may work through two channels: first, the 
BIT may encourage FDI by reducing the risk of expropriation; second by providing better 
market access. In general, EU BITs provide post-establishment rights granting the investor 
equal rights as the domestic investor. However, there are some BITs that also provide FDI 
liberalisation through granting MFN rights by including pre-establishment clauses. In an 
attempt to discriminate between the two channels mentioned above, we introduce a political risk 
index referred to the host economy and ranging from 0 (highest risk) to 25 (lowest risk). This 
index is computed by Eschenbach et al. (2004) based on the Euromoney political risk index, and 
provides a (subjective) assessment of the risk of non-payment or non-servicing of payment for 
goods or services, loans, trade-related finance and dividends, as well as of the risk of non-
repatriation of capital. This index is a proxy for the risk of expropriation, and helps us control 
for the effect of political risk on FDI inflows. In column 1, Table 3, the EU BIT dummy is 
robust to the inclusion of the POLITY dummy. In column 2 we control for RISK in the host 
country as well and the economic impact of the EU BIT increases slightly and this variable has 
a positive impact as expected. This may suggest that BITs do not only provide investor 
protection to EU investors but also increase market access.  
Table 7 presents results from BITs of different member states. The motivation here is to see 
whether there is a pattern in which certain member states’ BITs deliver better results. Indeed, 
we can see that the coefficient of BITs is positive for several member states but only statistically 
significant for Austria and France. There is evidence in our sample that Portugal has been 
negatively affected by its BITs. However, when we control for the risk of expropriation, only 
France remains as a beneficiary of its BITs. This may indicate that Austria might be choosing its 
BITs partners among the riskier emerging economies to protect from expropriation. France on 
the other hand, might be achieving market access as well.  
In Table 8 we explore the differential impact of the BIT due to the selection of the BIT partner. 
In other words, we ask the question: which host countries have benefited from the EU’s BITs? 
Our results indicate that only the Philippines, Romania and Slovenia have increased FDI inflows 
after the implementation of the EU BITs, whereas Hungary has received less FDI. Finally, we 
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check the robustness of our results and test for endogeneity by introducing a dummy on BITs 
for t+1, following Baier and Bergstand (2007). We find no feedback-effect in our sample.
8 
5. Conclusion 
Several policy relevant issues regarding EU’s bilateral investment treaties have been addressed 
in this paper. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the right to negotiate investment treaties has been 
transferred to the Commission from the member states. As the world’s largest source of FDI 
outflows, the EU27 has signed 1557 BITs, compared to the US, which has only 48 and Japan 
11. As the existing BITs will be grandfathered, several questions remain unanswered. First and 
foremost, we explored the question whether EU’s BITs have a significantly positive impact on 
outflows or not. Second, we asked the question which member states and which BIT partners 
have had a significant experience after the implementation of the BIT.  
In our sample, we found that both OECD BITs and EU BITs have a statistically significant and 
positive impact on FDI outflows. This result is robust to the inclusion of variables such as 
privatisation proceeds that control for the level of economic reform, the level of trade linkages, 
the level of democratic freedom and a measure of risk of expropriation among other standard 
controls. Our results are also robust in terms of the selection of estimator. We controlled for 
endogeneity in our estimations by using the fixed-effects estimator as the preferred estimator on 
a large panel dataset. As most of the time the endogeneity is due to uncontrolled unobserved 
heterogeneity, using fixed-effects on panel data is an efficient method to deal with endogeneity. 
We also tested the strict exogeneity of our results by using a method suggested by Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007) and we found no feedback effect in our sample.  
Our results have a number of important policy implications. First, it is important to ensure 
investor security throughout the transition period. As our results indicate, BITs have been an 
effective tool so far. Next, it is important to decide the shape and contents of an EU BIT. This 
could be based on best practice. Here, our results are suggestive as we do not consider the 
details of the BITs. Even though there is a basic format to all BITs with standard sections there 
may be several significant differences in the language contained. For example, one important 
difference between US BITs and EU BITs is that the US BITs do provide FDI liberalisation. In 
further research we will also address these differences. In terms of the future EU investment 
partners, the third countries that have benefited positively from signing BITs with EU member 
states should be given longer transition periods while member states adjust individual BITs to 
harmonise with a common EU BIT format. 
Table 1. EU27 FDI and BITs  
  Number of BITs  Extra-EU27 outward FDI 
Austria 65  35,644 
Belgium-Luxembourg 77  NA 
Bulgaria 54  376 
Czech Rep  79  446 
Denmark 43  48,910 
Cyprus 16  4,781 
Finland   62  17,864 
France 103  354,660 
Estonia 23  621 
                                                      
8 The results are available upon request.  8 | SELEN SARISOY GUERIN 
Greece 38  9,849 
Hungary 58  5,097 
Germany 147  334,900 
Ireland 1  36,424 
Italy 83  80,521 
Netherlands 105  203,612 
Malta 22  209 
Latvia 43  431 
Lithuania 42  487 
Poland 62  6,354 
Portugal 45  16,215 
Romania 84  571 
Slovakia 40  205 
Slovenia 36  4,621 
Spain 61  187,820 
Sweden 66  78,481 
UK 102  603,075 
US 48  2,272,056 
Japan 11  489,456 
    
Total 1557   
Source: ICSID, Eurostat. 
Table 2. Regional allocation of EU27 BITs 
 Africa  Asia  Latin  America 
Austria 8  16  7 
Belgium-Luxembourg 17  19  11 
Bulgaria 4  7  1 
Cyprus 2  3  - 
Czech Rep  4  11  12 
Denmark 8  13  8 
Estonia   2   
Finland 6  16  12 
France 21  24  20 
Germany 47  26  22 
Greece 6  8  3 
Hungary 4  12  5 
Italy 18  15  12 
Latvia 1  9   
Lithuania   8 2 
Malta 3     
Netherlands 27  19  18 
Poland 3  14  3 
Portugal 12  6  8 
Romania 10  15  8 DO THE EUROPEAN UNION’S BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES MATTER? | 9 
Slovak Rep  1  8  1 
Slovenia 1  3   
Spain 8  11  19 
Sweden 11  16  10 
UK 21  23  19 
      
Total 243  304  201 
Source: ICSID, World Bank.  
Table 3. EU27 BIT partners, FDI stocks, income (million €) and return 
  Number of BITs 
with the EU 
EU27 FDI stock  FDI income  Rate of Return 
Argentina 18  44,103  4,139  9% 
Brazil 9  112,520  9,288  8% 
Chile 17  12,324  1,762  14% 
China 24  47,285  3,431  7% 
Colombia 2  7,178  745  10% 
Egypt 23  20,933  1,821  9% 
India 19  19,362  1,825  9% 
Indonesia 15  13,106  1,457  11% 
Malaysia 15  12,979  1,590  12% 
Mexico 14  49,048  3,765  8% 
Morocco 17  14,133  637  5% 
Russia 21  91,955  6,324  7% 
South Africa  13  46,345  4,362  9% 
Philippines 13  6,260  509  8% 
Thailand 12  10,625  395  4% 
Turkey 23  51,660  2,731  5% 
Czech 25  67,735  7,005  10% 
Bulgaria 22  11,443  849  7% 
Poland 23  86,899  6,525  8% 
Romania 22  31,163  2,492  8% 
Slovenia 21  5,513  355  6% 
Slovakia 21  24,401  1,578  6% 
Korea 19  28,888  3,362  12% 
Source: ICSID, World Bank and Eurostat and author’s own calculations. 
Table 4. OECD Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Dependent variable: ln (FDI)ijt 
 Fixed-effects  Random-effects  OLS 
Ln GDP it  2.74 (0.84)***  0.05 (0.09)  0.06 (0.05) 
Ln GDP jt  2.22 (2.52)  -0.07 (0.08)  0.02 (0.05) 
Ln GDP per capita it  -2.11 (0.84)***  0.52 (0.08)***  0.57 (0.04)*** 
Ln GDP per capita jt  -2.51 (2.56)  0.52 (0.19)***  1.23 (0.14)*** 
BIT dummy  0.28 (0.10)***  0.42 (0.09)***  0.14 (0.08)* 10 | SELEN SARISOY GUERIN 
Ln privatization  0.05 (0.01)***  0.04 (0.02)**  0.08 (0.02)*** 
Ln trade   1.09 (0.11)***  1.05 (0.07)***  0.89 (0.04)*** 
Ln distance    0.10 (0.10)  0.09 (0.02)*** 
Colony    0.66 (0.63)  0.96 (0.19)*** 
      
Overall adj-R
2 0.20  0.48  0.51 
Within R
2 0.17  0.16   
N 2079  2079  2079 
F value  7.19     
Time dummies  YES  YES  YES 
Regression with robust standard errors for correction of heteroscedasticity in parentheses. 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%, - non significant coefficient. 
Table 5. EU Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Dependent variable: ln (FDI)ijt 
 Fixed-effects  Random-effects  OLS 
Ln GDP it  -1.72 (1.02)*  0.11 (0.06)  0.02 (0.05) 
Ln GDP jt  -5.85 (3.10)*  0.12 (0.08)  0.06 (0.05) 
Ln GDP per capita it  2.11 (1.00)**  0.41 (0.08)***  0.57 (0.04)*** 
Ln GDP per capita jt  6.55 (3.24)**  0.99 (0.21)***  1.27 (0.15)*** 
EU BIT dummy  0.20 (0.12)*  0.18 (0.10)*  0.09 (0.08) 
Ln privatization  0.05 (0.02)***  0.05 (0.02)***  0.08 (0.02)*** 
Ln trade   0.50 (0.14)***  0.82 (0.06)***  0.89 (0.04)*** 
Ln distance      0.06 (0.05) 
Colony     0.96  (0.19)*** 
      
Overall adj-R
2 0.11  0.50  0.51 
Within R
2 0.20  0.20   
N 2107  2107  2079 
F value  7.33     
Time dummies  YES  YES  YES 
Regression with robust standard errors for correction of heteroskedasticity in parentheses. 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%, - non significant coefficient. 
Table 6. EU Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Dependent variable: ln (FDI)ijt 
 Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects 
Ln GDP it  -1.74 (1.03)*  -1.55 (1.42) 
Ln GDP jt  -5.85 (3.11)*  -9.08 (4.39)** 
Ln GDP per capita it  2.11 (1.01)**  1.84 (1.41) 
Ln GDP per capita jt  6.55 (3.25)**  9.32 (4.56)** 
EU BIT dummy  0.21 (0.10)*  0.24 (0.14)* 
Ln privatization  0.05 (0.02)***  0.07 (0.02)*** 
Ln trade   0.49 (0.13)***  0.36 (0.17)** DO THE EUROPEAN UNION’S BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES MATTER? | 11 
POLITY -0.01  (0.01)   
RISK   0.04  (0.02)** 
    
Overall adj-R
2 0.11  0.13 
Within R
2 0.20  0.21 
N 2107  1538 
F value  7.24  6.22 
Time dummies  YES  YES 
Regression with robust standard errors for correction of heteroscedasticity in parentheses. 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%, - non significant coefficient. 
Table 7. EU Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Dependent variable: ln (FDI)ijt 
 Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects 
Austria BIT  0.82 (0.35)**  0.64 (0.48) 
Denmark BIT  0.04 (0.64)  0.33 (0.68) 
Finland BIT  0.11 (0.36)  0.26 (0.44) 
France BIT  1.16 (0.31)***  1.09 (0.38)*** 
Germany BIT  -0.44 (0.36) -0.60  (0.46) 
Italy BIT  -0.05 (0.25)  0.20 (0.30) 
Netherlands BIT  0.35 (0.34)  0.41 (0.38) 
Portugal BIT  -0.87 (0.49)* -0.96  (0.74) 
Spain BIT  0.43 (0.32)  0.33 (0.34) 
Sweden BIT  0.45 (0.64)   
UK BIT  -0.33 (0.34)  -0.28 (0.38) 
Ln GDP it Yes  Yes 
Ln GDP jt Yes  Yes 
Ln GDP per capita it Yes  Yes 
Ln GDP per capita jt Yes  Yes 
Ln privatization  Yes  Yes 
Ln trade   Yes  Yes 
RISK   0.05  (0.02)* 
    
Overall adj-R
2 0.11  0.13 
Within R
2 0.22  0.22 
N 2107  1538 
F value  6.24  5.35 
Time dummies  YES  YES 
Regression with robust standard errors for correction of heteroscedasticity in parentheses. 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%, - non significant coefficient. 
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Table 8. EU Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Dependent variable: ln (FDI)ijt 
 Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects 
Argentina 0.39  (0.41)  NS 
Chile -0.41  (0.38)  NS 
China -0.58  (0.71)   
Bulgaria -0.32  (0.40) -0.90  (0.53)* 
Czech R  -0.42 (0.71)  NS 
Egypt 0.37  (0.72)  NS 
Hungary  -2.71 (1.35)**  -2.65 (1.33)** 
Indonesia   -0.55 (0.27)  NS 
India 0.18  (0.27)  NS 
Mexico 0.55  (0.56)  NS 
Morocco -0.41  (0.57)  NS 
Philippines  0.90 (0.47)**  1.00 (0.54)* 
Poland -0.20  (0.53)  NS 
Romania  1.09 (0.33)***  1.01 (0.38)*** 
Russia -0.66  (0.89)   
South Africa  0.62 (0.36)*  NS 
Slovenia 1.16  (0.64)*   
Slovak R  -0.05 (0.84)  NS 
Thailand 0.40  (0.75)  NS 
Turkey 0.02  (0.53)  NS 
Ln GDP it Yes  Yes 
Ln GDP jt Yes  Yes 
Ln GDP per capita it Yes  Yes 
Ln GDP per capita jt Yes  Yes 
Ln privatization  Yes  Yes 
Ln trade   Yes  Yes 
RISK   0.04  (0.02)* 
    
Overall adj-R
2 0.12  0.13 
Within R
2 0.22  0.23 
N 2107  1538 
F value  6.71  5.80 
Time dummies  YES  YES 
Regression with robust standard errors for correction of heteroscedasticity in parentheses. 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%, - non significant coefficient. 
NS Not significant. 
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